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1 Introduction
Vintage capital models are increasingly used to investigate several key economic issues
ranging from optimal investment policies (Jovanovic, 2009) to economic growth and fluc-
tuations (Kobayashi and Sakuragawa, 2008). We shall argue in this paper that these models
are also most convenient to study technology adoption problems, particularly adoption of
clean technologies, one of the hottest topics in many agendas lately. Indeed, since a signifi-
cant part of pollution can be attributed to energy consumption, the development of cleaner
technologies has often consisted in searching for more energy-saving technologies. Essen-
tially, the development of less energy-consuming technologies corresponds to the concep-
tion of new capital goods, new vintages, requiring less energy to be operated than older
vintages. Therefore the vintage capital framework is natural to study the diffusion of clean
technologies and to desgin the policies allowing to fasten it. Beside realism, there are at
least three reasons to use these models:
1. First of all, in such a setting technological progress is embodied in capital goods so
that switching to cleaner technologies amounts to investing in new machines, imply-
ing that there is no need to distinguish between technology adoption and investment.
In short, investment subsidies can be roughly interpreted as technology adoption sub-
sidies without any additional specifications increasing the size of the model.
2. Second, a nice property of this kind of models (see in particular, Boucekkine et al.,
1997 and 1998) is that an investment subsidy does also induce firms to shorten the
lifetime of operating capital goods, therefore inducing scrapping of the less profitable
machines. Thus, within such a set-up, there is no need to distinguish between invest-
ment subsidies and scrapping subsidies.
3. Last but not least, another sensitive property of this class of models connects the op-
timal scrapping time with the cost (or price) of the production inputs. A machine
or technology is thrown out once its profitability drops to zero, and of course prof-
itability depends on the operation cost of the capital good involved (see the seminal
Solow et al., 1966, Malcomson, 1975, and again Boucekkine et al., 1997). Therefore,
the efficiency of investment subsidies should tightly depend on the price formation of
inputs, like energy, that is on the market structure of the associated inputs.
In this paper, we do not inquire whether a substantial part of the gains in energy effi-
ciency is due or not to induced-innovation-like mechanisms, technological progress is ex-
ogenous. Numerous papers have been already devoted to this issue (see for example Jaffe
and Stavins, 1995). One of the most recent is due to Acemoglu et al. (2011) who con-
sider a unique final good produced by combining inputs from two sectors, one using dirty
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machines and the other operating clean machines (with no negative impact on the envi-
ronment). Research can be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sec-
tor. Optimal reserach strategy and fiscal incentives are then designed to ensure sustainable
growth. This idea is rather old and has been investigated in many previously published pa-
pers, including Hart (2004). In the latter, an explicit vintage capital formulation is adopted.
However, the number of existing vintages is fixed exogenously, and not determined by an
optimal scrapping condition in the tradition of Solow et al. (1966). Therefore, the essence
of vintage modelling is not really accounted for. To our knowledge, the unique paper com-
bining vintage modelling (in the proper sense) and endogenous technical progress, and
henceforth studing the induced-innovation hypothesis in a proper vintage model, is due to
Boucekkine et al. (2011). However, the latter suffers from a major drawback: it involves a
dramatically high computational cost, which disables a deep analytical characterization in
general equilibrium. Boucekkine et al. (2011) only solve a partial equilibrium version (that
is, the firm problem) of the model.
In this paper, we are exclusively concerned about the effectiveness of fiscal instruments
in favoring investment in the new and cleaner technologies, and about their impact on GDP:
under a given pace for energy-saving technical progress, do investment (in new capital
goods) subsidies and/or scrappage subsidies have ultimately a positive impact on invest-
ment and output? This question is far from obvious in a general equilibrium framework
where energy suppliers may also react to such policies. This paper highlights the crucial
role of market structure in this respect, in particular the energy market.
Few papers have been devoted to analyze the energy questions outlined above within a
vintage structure, probably due to the mathematical sophistication implied by this structure
(compared to the homogenous capital structure). In addition to the paper by Boucekkine et
al. (2011) cited above, Pe´rez Barahona and Zou (2006) and Bertinelli et al. (2008) are among
these few devoted to the analysis of long-term consequences of exogenous energy-saving
technological progress, highlighting some non-standard implications of vintage models.
In this paper, we keep energy-saving technological progress exogenous but we depart from
the standard assumptions in the vintage literature by introducing an explicit energy market.
The modelling of this market is simple: producing energy requires only the final good in
our model. However, such a benchmark framework allows to analytically study how the
structure of energy markets does affect the pace of energy-saving technology diffusion.1
We shall highlight how the specific mechanisms operating within a vintage capital model
shape the effect of investment subsidies on energy-use and macroeconomic performance
1One should note that the effect of investment subsidies on energy use as analyzed in this paper should
be distinguished from the well-known rebound effect. Indeed, the rebound effect, which is recognized in the
literature as closely related to the use of energy-saving technologies (see, e.g., Berkhout et al. 2000, Khazzoom
1980, Sorrell and Dimitropoulos 2008, Wirl 1997), is entirely isolated from the analysis because technological
progress is exogenous.
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given the market structure of the energy market and for a given pace of energy-saving
technical progress.
It is nowadays widely admitted that imperfect competition (externalities, barriers, market
power, etc.) may explain the observed energy-efficiency gap or the slow diffusion of energy-
saving technologies, and that public intervention is a necessary condition for organizing the
markets and promoting energy efficiency (see, e.g., De Almeida 1998, and Brown, 2001).
Our point is however on the energy market, which has received much less attention in the
related macroeconomic literature.2 To highlight the crucial importance of energy market
structure in the performance of energy-saving technologies’ subsidies, we consider two po-
lar market structures for this market: free entry and natural monopoly. These two cases are
not only interesting for tractability but also to partially assess the recent restructuring and
regulatory reforms that have targeted the energy sector, particularly electricity, in the USA
and Europe towards more competition in energy markets to achieve a higher energy effi-
ciency. Natural monopoly is a plausible assumption as energy markets generates enormous
fixed costs and economies of scale. Water, electricity, and natural gas utilities are typically
cited as examples of natural monopolies. In fact, recent deregulation policies observed in
several countries (e.g. Argentina, England, New Zealand, Europe, the USA, and Japan) has
aimed to encourage a competitive energy generation sector, energy transmission and dis-
tribution remaining close to a regulated monopoly situation (Joskow, 1997, Crampes and
Moreaux, 2001). Studying the two extreme cases pointed out above, while certainly insuf-
ficient to reflect the complexity of actual energy markets, sounds as a desirable benchmark
analysis though.
In the environmental literature, the role of subsidies was analyzed in several studies. Based
on US data regarding the adoption of thermal insulation technology in new home construc-
tion, Jaffe and Stavins (1995) found that technology adoption subsidies have positive effect
on the energy efficiency of new homes. De Groot et al. (2001) also observed for a survey of
Dutch firms that cost savings are the most important driving force for investing in energy-
saving technologies, which suggests an effective role of policy measures like subsidies and
fiscal arrangements in promoting for higher energy efficiency. However, possible adverse
effects of subsidies were also pointed out. For example, Verhoef and Nijkamp (2003) found
in another heterogenous firms modeling that the promotion of energy-efficiency enhancing
technologies by means of subsidies may be counter-productive because it could actually
increase energy use. De Groot et al. (2002) suggested that investment subsidies for energy-
saving technologies can be also counter-productive as they may favor a lock-in into rela-
tively inferior technologies. Bjørner and Jensen (2002) found in a panel of Danish industrial
firms that subsidies in energy efficiency have no significant effect on energy use.
2For example, Pe´rez Barahona and Zou (2006) assume an exogenously given energy supply.
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Within our theoretical set-up, we shall show that a rise in investment subsidy will in-
crease the price of energy either under free entry or natural monopoly. This property comes
directly from a specific “vintage” mechanism, that’s property 3 outlined above: lifetime of
capital goods and energy prices are tightly related via the scrapping conditions inherent
to vintage models. Such a canonical relationship is a at the start of a fully articulated and
original mechanism affecting both equilibrium energy use, diffusion of new (and cleaner)
technologies and macroeconomic performances. Indeed, we show that whence the energy
price increases either under free entry or natural monopoly, energy output increases under
free entry, and falls down under monopoly. Given the complementarity between energy
and capital, the latter effect may even end up pushing investment level down in the lat-
ter case! Applied to the debate of promoting energy-saving technologies, our paper brings
out several findings. First, we show that while subsidies may induce a larger investment
into cleaner technologies either under free entry or natural monopoly, this is not always
granted. For example, in the natural monopoly case, this happens if and only if the average
cost is decreasing fast enough. Second, larger diffusion rates do not necessarily mean lower
energy consumption at equilibrium, which may explain certain empirical observations.
We also provide for comparison an analysis of the implications of a carbon tax policy.
The related empirical literature is obviously much thinner than the one devoted the study
of the efficiency of investment subsidies. The absence of international agreements on the
implementation of a carbon tax makes it difficult to implement it at a national level (see
Hoel, 1993, for a discussion). This said, some national plans to implement a carbon tax are
under way.3 For example, Ireland has implemented a carbon tax since 2009. A key aspect
is the way the resources collected by the tax are used. This point is made, among others,
by Coneferey et al. (2008): they find that a double dividend exists if the carbon tax revenue
is recycled through reduced income taxes. If the revenue is recycled by giving a lump-
sum transfer to households, a double dividend is unlikely to occur. In this paper, we do not
tackle this question, we mainly aim to identify the impact of a carbon tax in a simple vintage
model like ours, abstracting away from second round effects coming from the further use
of taxes collected. The idea is to compare with the impact of investment subsidies, which
are so far a much more popular policy instrument.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the vintage model with energy-saving
technical progress. Section 3 provides the balanced growth path where all endogenous
variables growth at the same constant rate. Section 4 discusses the impacts of investment
subsidies on the economy. Section 5 describes briefly the impact of a carbon tax in our
model. Section 6 concludes the study.
3Some have been simpy abandoned as in France where the carbon tax plan, included in the so called Grenelle
environmental package led by the French environment minister Borloo, has been roughly abandoned in 2010.
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2 A vintage capital model with energy-saving technical progress
Relying on Boucekkine et al. (1997), we build a decentralized vintage capital model with
energy-saving technological progress where the energy sector is either governed by a nat-
ural monopoly or under free entry. This model has some salient characteristics. First of
all, the production function is linear in vintage capital, following the traditional specifica-
tion of Solow et al. (1966). Second, to guarantee the existence of a balanced growth path
(see Solow et al., 1966, for an illuminating assessment of this question), we will assume
that the successive vintages only differ in their (decreasing) energy requirement, and not in
their productivity. Thirdly, growth is exogenous. We start by a detailed exposition of the
structure of the model and its properties.4
2.1 Households
Let us assume that the representative household solves a maximization problem with non-
linear instantaneous utility function:
max
{c(t),a(t)}
∫ ∞
0
u[c(t)] e−ρt dt, (1)
subject to the budget constraint
a˙(t) = r(t)a(t)− c(t)− τ(t),
with initial wealth a0 given; c(t) and a(t) represent per capita consumption and per capita
asset holden by household respectively. The interest rate r(t) is taken as given by the house-
hold. τ(t) is per-capita lump-sum taxes. In the model, investment subsidies are entirely
financed through this type of taxes. This is the simplest way to disentangle the role of the
latter subsidies. For simplification, we shall consider a logarithmic utility function. This
optimization problem is very standard, and the corresponding necessary conditions are:
c˙
c = r(t) − ρ, with limt→∞ φ(t)a(t) = 0, where φ(t) is the co-state variable associated with
the wealth accumulation equation.5
4An earlier version of this paper includes a more sophisticated 3-sector model. In this version, we remove
the intermediate inputs sectors (and the associated monopolistic competition) to drastically simplify the algebra
and to focus on the main contribution of the paper: how does the energy market structure affect the impact of
investment subsidies in an otherwise standard vintage capital growth model?
5We shall abstract hereafter from the transversality conditions involved in the optimization work along the
paper, and assume convergence to well-defined balanced growth paths granted. More mathematical literature
about this specific issue can be found in Boucekkine et al. (1997, 1998).
6
2.2 Final good sector
The final good is produced competitively and the representative final firm is price-taker
and solves the following problem:
max
y(t),i(t),T (t)}
∫ ∞
0
[y(t)− pe(t)e(t)− (1− sq(t))i(t)]R(t) dt (2)
subject to
y(t) = b
∫ t
t−T (t)
i(z) dz (3)
e(t) =
∫ t
t−T (t)
q(z)i(z) dz (4)
q(t) = e−γt (5)
with initial conditions i(t) given ∀ t < 0. i(t) is investment in capital of vintage t, y(t) is
production of the final good at t, and e(t) is energy use at the firm level. pe(t) and sq(t)
denote energy price and subsidies devoted to the purchase of new equipment respectively.
The final good is the numeraire. b is a fixed productivity parameter. Equation (3), (4) and
(5) describe the technology used at the firm level in the final good sector. The production
function (3) is Leontief, capital and energy are assumed to be gross complements. It is
widely admitted that there exist at least a certain degree of complementarity between these
two inputs, so that the Leontief technology used here is in the worse case a worthwhile
benchmark. Moreover, as explained in Boucekkine et al. (1997), such a complementarity
is needed to have finite time scrapping at equilibrium. In particular, (4) gives total energy
demand at the firm level, which depends on the energy requirements of all active machines.
Recall that in this framework, technical progress is assumed to make machines (equipment)
less energy-consuming over time. In equation (3) and (4), it is modeled via the variable q(t):
a machine of vintage z requires q(t) = e−γt units of energy, γ > 0 is therefore the given rate
of energy-saving technical chance. Finally, government subsidizes the acquisition of new
machines via sq(t) following from taxes τ(t). The discount factor R(t) takes the form:
R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 r(z) dz
Following Malcomson (1975), after changing the order of integration and applying some
algebra, the problem can be rewritten as
max
{y(t),i(t),J(t)}
∫ ∞
0
[(1− λ(t)) y(t)− (1− sq(t))i(t)]R(t) dt
+
∫ ∞
0
i(t)
∫ t+J(t)
t
[bλ(z)− pe(z)q(t)]R(z) dz dt
+
∫ 0
−T (t)
i(t)
∫ t+J(t)
0
[bλ(z)− pe(z)q(t)]R(z) dz dt
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where λ(t) denotes the shadow value of y(t) and J(t) = T (t + J(t)). Notice that T (t) =
J(t − T (t)). J(t) is the optimal life of machines of vintage t. The first order conditions (for
an interior maximum) with respect to y(t), i(t) and J(t) are respectively, ∀ t ≥ 0:
λ(t) = 1
R(t)(1− sq(t)) =
∫ t+J(t)
t
[
b− pe(z) e−γt
]
R(z) dz
b = pe(t) e
−γ(t−T (t))
where now q(t) = e−γt is explicitly replaced. The first condition non-surprisingly stipu-
lates that the shadow price of output should be equal to 1. The second equation gives the
optimal investment rule equalizing the marginal cost of acquiring one unit of (new) capital
goods at t and the marginal benefit which amounts to the actualized sum of net benefits
over the expected lifetime of the acquired good (that is from t to t + J(t)). The last equa-
tion is the typical scrapping condition, mentioned repeatedly in the introduction section, it
corresponds to the optimality condition with respect to J(t), and can be rewritten as:
pe(t) = b e
γ(t−T (t)).
This is the counterpart of the classical scrapping condition in Leontief vintage capital mod-
els, with energy playing the role of labor in the early vintage models a` la Solow et al. (1966).
The marginal value of energy, the price pe(t) at the decentralized equilibrium, should be
equal to the marginal productivity of energy, here equal to b eγ(t−T (t)), where eγ(t−T (t)) is
the inverse of the energy requirement of the oldest vintage still in use at t. Therefore, as
announced before, the scrapping condition induced by our vintage structures does connect
tightly energy price with the optimal lifetime of machines. This connection is key in the
main results produced in this paper.
2.3 Energy sector
In the energy sector, we assume that the production function only uses the final good ac-
cording to:
f(ht) =
(
h(t)
A(t)
)α
, (6)
where h(t) denotes the quantity of final goods devoted to energy production, and A(t) is
an exogenous variable intended to capture the difficulty or complexity to produce energy.
Indeed, the specified production function implies that to produce one unit of energy, A(t)
units of the final good are needed, A(t) could be therefore interpreted as a marginal cost.
As it will be clear later, our model requires A(t) to be growing over time (or energy to be
increasingly difficult to produce) for a regular balanced growth path to arise. In this sense,
our specification is close in spirit to the models incorporating complexity to guarantee bal-
anced growth paths (like Segerstrom, 2000). The profit of a firm in the energy sector is:
pi(t) = pe(t)f(h(t))− h(t) (7)
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where we remind that pe(t) denotes the energy price. We shall distinguish two market
structures:
1. The natural monopoly: This is the case of decreasing average cost, typically implied
by the existence of fixed costs. This structure is obtained when setting α > 1. Here-
after we refer to it as the NM structure.
2. Free entry: This is the case of increasing average cost and free entry that is typically
obtained under decreasing returns, α < 1. We refer to it as the FE structure (FE for
free entry).6
In both cases, the pricing of energy will correspond to the zero profit condition:
pe(t) = h(t)
1−α A(t)α. (8)
While the condition is formally the same in both cases, it does not cover the same kind
of equilibrium concept. In the natural monopoly case, it corresponds to the well-known
second-best Ramsey-Boiteux pricing (see, e.g., Sherman 1989, Carlton and Perloff 2005).7
This paper will show clearly that the economic implications of investment subsidies strongly
depend on the market structure considered for the energy sector.
Beside the choice of the polar market structures considered, which are justified more ex-
tensively below, our modelling of the energy sector requires some further comments. First
of all, we assume that the sole input in production is the final good. This is made for sim-
plicity: we could have considered another good, non-renewable natural resources (with
the corresponding extraction sector), in addition to the final good (representing renewable
resources in our model). This would have rather obscured the mechanisms inherent to vin-
tage models we want to isolate. Second, it is important to note that no optimization (by
energy producers) is explicitly considered here: for example in the free entry case, we only
pick the ultimate zero-profit condition. Third, we do not introduce fixed costs in the nat-
ural monopoly case to avoid redundancy with the increasing returns assumption through
parameter α, which is enough to generate decreasing average production costs. Fourth,
assuming A increasing is not only needed for balanced growth paths to exist, it also seems
to be compatible with the recent observations of the IEA (2008), notably for the electricity
generating sector. According to the IEA (2008) there have recently been sharp increases in
construction costs of new power plants, particularly in OCDE countries (i.e. in the United
States, the construction costs of nuclear power plants are at least 50% higher than previously
6We shall exclude the case α = 1 in our study, it will be crystal clear in the next section that a balanced
growth path cannot exist under this zero-measure parameterization.
7It should be noted that while the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is profusely studied in theoretical models con-
cerning the energy sector it is few observed in practice (despite its desirable properties) because of some con-
cerns on ethical consideration and practical implementation (Netz, 2000).
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expected). Factors cause these higher costs are: increases in the costs of materials used in
power plants (iron, steel, aluminium, copper), increases in energy costs, tight manufactur-
ing capacity, increases in labor costs, etc. Also, the IEA (2008) predicts that electricity prices
are expected to increase in the future, mainly due to fuel price increase and higher construc-
tion costs. In particular, projected electricity prices are on average about 11% higher in 2030
than in 2006 in OECD countries.
Finally, and as briefly mentioned in the introduction, the two market structures considered
here can be motivated by numerous studies. For example, Crampes and Moreaux (2001)
underlined that transmission and distribution of electricity have common features of nat-
ural monopoly while competition may work for generation. This observation is consistent
with the empirical results of Christensen and Greene (1976) who found that the U.S. electric
power generation sector was governed by scale economies in 1955 while almost all firms
were operating in 1970 in the flat area of the average cost curve and a non trivial amount
of electricity was generated by a firm with diseconomies of scale. However, in a recent
study Hisnanick and Kymn (1999) reached a different conclusion: for them, increasing re-
turns to scale are prevailing in US electric power companies for the period 1957-1987. In
the case of Japan, Hosoe (2006) observed that natural monopoly prevails in the electricity
industry except the generation sector where there is no definite (or very weak) evidence of
scale economy. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1998) found that gas marketing and customer
service costs of the British gas sector represent a constant returns to scale when domestic
and non-domestic outputs (in terms of British Gas regions) rise by the same proportion.
There were however economies of scale when one output is held fixed and the other is kept
expending. Isoard and Soria (2001) found that the European emerging renewable energy
sector (namely photovoltaic and wind technologies) has a decreasing returns to scale pro-
duction (the coefficient of returns to scale ranged from 0.8 to 1) in the short run but would
not diverge from a constant returns to scale production in the long run.
By studying the two polar market structures, we aim to exemplify some key economic
mechanisms which are relevant in the performance of clean energies promotion policies,
which would be otherwise hidden in a model with a more complex (realistic) picture for
the energy market. To make things even simpler, we focus on the steady state decentralized
equilibrium.
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2.4 Decentralized equilibrium
From previous sections, the equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the following
system, ∀ t ≥ 0:
c˙
c
= r − ρ (9)
y(t) = b
∫ t
t−T (t)
i(z) dz (10)
R(t)(1− sq(t)) =
∫ t+J(t)
t
[
b− pe(z) e−γt
]
R(z) dz (11)
b = pe(t) e
−γ(t−T (t)) (12)
f(h(t)) =
∫ t
t−T (t)
i(z) e−γz dz (13)
y(t) = i(t) + c(t) + h(t) (14)
J(t) = T (t+ J(t)) (15)
with initial conditions i(t), ∀ t ≤ 0 given. Equation (13) represents the equilibrium in the
energy market where here f(h(t)) denotes the energy supply and where the parameter γ
represents (Harrod neutral) technical progress. Equation (14) represents the equilibrium in
the goods market. All others equations were previously derived from agents’ problems.
Equations (9)-(15) allow us to solve the endogenous variables y(t), c(t), r(t), i(t), J(t), T (t)
and pe(t) given the exogenous technological process. We also assume balanced budget, that
is investment subsidies are entired financed by lump-sum taxes: sq(t)i(t) = τ(t). The latter
equation is residual, it allows to compute the amount of lump-sum taxes needed to balance
the budget, for given investment subsidy rates and the induced investment pattern.
3 Balanced growth paths
Let us define the environment for balanced growth path (BGP). We assume that at the sta-
tionary equilibrium, c(t) = c eγt, pe(t) = pe eγt, y(t) = y eγt, i(t) = i eγt. Accordingly, we set
τ(t) = τ eγt and A(t) = Aeγt, for the BGP to exist.
Definition.- The BGP equilibrium is a situation where all endogenous variables grow at the same
constant rate γ except J(t) = T (t) = T .
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We obtain:
r = γ + ρ (16)
y = c+ i+ h (17)
y = b
i
γ
(1− e−γT ) (18)
1− sq
b
=
∫ t+T
t
[
1− eγ(z−T ) e−γt
]
e−r(z−t) dz (19)
pe = b e
−γT (20)∫ t
t−T
i(z)e−γz dz =
(
h
A
)α
, and then iT =
(
h
A
)α
(21)
pe = h
1−α Aα (22)
Finally, setting u = z − t we can compute the stationary value for the scrapping age:
1− sq
b
=
∫ T
0
[
1− e−γ(T−u)
]
e−(γ+ρ)u du ≡ F (T, γ, ρ) (23)
which defines function F (T, γ, ρ). This integral function can also be rewritten as
F (T, γ, ρ) =
∫ T
0
∫ T
τ
γ exp{−ρz − γσ} dσ du (24)
Along the balanced growth path, the optimal investment rule simplifies to (23). In particu-
lar, F (T, γ, ρ) provides a measure of the marginal return from investment in the long run.
Using (24), we can derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a balanced growth
path (defined above) to exist. Indeed, the stationary system above has a clear recursive
structure. This nice configuration is mainly due to the Leontief technology used by the in-
termediate inputs producers.8 Once T computed, all the other unknowns can be recovered
immediately from the system (16)-(22). For example, equilibrium energy price level can
be recovered from (20) given T , and once this price computed, one can use equation (22)
to calculate the long-term energy sector input h. And so on. The existence of a long run
scrapping age along a balanced growth path is settled in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 A balanced growth path (BGP) exists if and only if ρ+ γ < b1−sq . If γ tends to zero,
T tends to infinity.
Proof. Proposition 1 states a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique long-run (pos-
itive) scrapping value T to exist, that is such that F (T, .) = 1−sqb . Indeed, by (24), F (T, .) is
strictly increasing in T . It should be noticed that F (T, .) is the integral value of a positive
function for which the integration support increases with T . Since F (0, γ, ρ) = 0, a positive
long run value for T exists if and only if limT→∞ F (T, .) >
1−sq
b . This limit is computed as:
lim
T→∞
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
z
γ e−ρz−γσ dσ du
)
=
1
ρ+ γ
8Removing this specification breaks down recursivity and makes the model analytically intractable.
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which gives the parametric condition of the proposition. Notice that when γ tends to zero
(no energy-saving technological progress), the integrand appearing in (24) tends to zero,
and T should consequently be infinite for the optimal investment rule to hold. 
The parametric condition identified for the existence of balanced growth paths is formally
identical to the one exhibited in Boucekkine et al. (1998) (with sq = 0). The productivity
parameter b should be large enough to “compensate” for depreciation and impatience. The
larger the subsidy, the easier the condition will be. Note also that the introduction of an
energy sector does not matter in the existence of the balanced growth paths. The main
reason behind this property is the Leontief technology adopted in the final good sector,
which induces that scrapping is independent of the energy production function.
Comparative statics show further interesting results from the economic point of view. Con-
sistently with Boucekkine et al. (1998), it is effectively possible to say more about the scrap-
ping behavior in terms of the parameters of the problem, using equations (23) and (24).
Proposition 2 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, the following properties hold:
(i) T is a decreasing function of b and sq. It is increasing in ρ.
(ii) T does not depend on the parameters of the energy sector production function, f(h).
(iii) T is decreasing with respect to γ provided T is lower than 1γ .
Proof. The proof of (iii) is quite hard given the complicated nature of the integral equation
(23). We report its demonstration in the Appendix. The first properties are trivial mathe-
matically speaking.
The depicted properties are mostly easy to get and to understand economically. For ex-
ample, notice that an increase in b decreases the left hand side of (23). Hence, F (T, γ, ρ)
should decrease for the optimal investment rule to be still valid. As function F (.) is strictly
increasing in T , the scrapping age should go down to keep on moving on the balanced
growth path. In economic terms, this outcome means that as capital goods become more
productive (whatever the vintage), the incentives to scrap old capital and to switch to clear
technologies become more important.
The same general argument would a priori apply to γ. However in our model, an increase
in γ raises the equilibrium interest rate by equation (16), which diminishes the marginal
return from investing. As in Boucekkine et al. (1998), and more recently in Boucekkine et
al. (2009), this negative effect is more than compensated by the positive one as long as the
interest burden is bounded over the lifetime of machines, for example when γT ≤ 1 (see the
Appendix). Hereafter, we shall assume that we are only considering the parameterizations
such that the latter property holds.9
9Notice that this is the realistic case. For γ around 2.5% per year, we restrict T to be lower than 40 years,
which covers by far the typical figures.
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Concerning the subsidy variable, the outcomes are rather clear and intuitive as far as scrap-
ping is concerned. For example, an increase in the investment subsidy decreases the marginal
cost of acquiring new machines, which accelerates scrapping and boosts new investment.
More intriguingly, notice that since equation (23) does not depend neither on the energy
production function f(h), the long-term optimal scrapping will neither. Indeed as one can
see from (21), a change in f(h) affects the optimal level of investment but not its lifetime.
This is a sensitive property of the model, and we shall use it intensively later on.
We now come to an important property which is crucial to understand why the energy
market structure is so important for the efficiency of subsidies. The following proposition
shows up some properties of energy supply and energy price, which are fundamental to
understand the mechanisms operating in our model.
Proposition 3 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 2 hold, the following properties hold:
(i) pe = pe(γ, b, sq) decreases with γ, but increases with b and sq.
(ii) Under the NM structure, h = h(γ, b, sq, A) has the opposite comparative statics of the
energy price pe, it is increasing in A.
(iii) Under the FE structure, h = h(γ, b, sq, A) has the same comparative statics as the energy
price pe, it is decreasing in A.
The proof is trivial. Using (20) and Proposition 2, one gets immediately that pe is increasing
in b directly, and via the scrapping variable T which goes down when each of these param-
eters increases. More straightforwardly, pe is an increasing function of the subsidy rate sq
exclusively via the scrapping variable. The effect of a technological acceleration through the
rate γ on pe is much harder to disentangle since pe is proportional to e−γT in the long-run,
and the scrapping time is shortened when γ is raised. The Lemma in the appendix solves
the problem. Actually, the product γT is an increasing function of γ, or in other terms T is
less than a linear function of γ. This establishes the properties (i) of the Proposition.
Properties (ii) and (iii) are obvious consequences of (i) and the relationship depicted in
equation (22), that’s:
pe = h
1−α Aα,
or
h = p
1
1−α
e A
α
α−1 .
As mentioned just above, Proposition 3 is important to get through the mechanisms of the
model. In particular, notice that in our model, a rise in investment subsidy does increase the
price of energy either under free entry or natural monopoly. This property comes from the
scrapping condition (12) (giving rise to the long-run relationship in equation (20)). This key
relationship is specific to vintage capital models with endogenous capital lifetime. As the
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increase in the subsidy rate leads to shorten the scrapping time, the total marginal operation
cost of the oldest vintage still in use goes down while the marginal productivity of any vin-
tage is kept constant, equal to b. The price of energy on the cost side of equation (12) should
go up to re-establish the optimality condition. Broadly speaking, it appears clearly that a
scrapping condition like the typical rule in (12) necessarily generates a negative correlation
between energy price and scrapping time for any shock which does not affect the produc-
tivity parameter, b. Some observations are in order here. First of all, a negative correlation
between energy prices and lifetime of capital goods is a fact which has been at the heart of
a highly interesting discussion for decades. For example, in Baily (1981), a higher energy
price is associated with a shorter capital lifetime, and this argument is quite central in his in-
terpretation of the productivity slowdown. While this view has been challenged in several
directions (see for example Gordon, 1981), it is commonly shared, and it can therefore be
used to validate the benchmark analysis we are performing in this paper. Second, it is also
absolutely clear that this negative correlation property is obtained so clearly here because
of the gross complementarity assumed between energy and capital: thanks to the Leontief
specification, the price of energy and scrapping time are not simultaneously determined
in the long-run, the investment rule (19) determines the scrapping time, and equation (20)
determines the energy price given the scrapping time. With a general production function,
things would have been much more complicated, but one can always claim that if energy
and capital are close to gross complements,10 our results should still hold. In any case, the
results obtained so far are anyway valuable as a benchmark.
While the subsidy rise increases energy price, its effect on energy supply depends on the
market structure of the energy sector: it raises the quantity of energy under free entry but
pushes it down under monopoly by equation (22). The latter generic equation implies a
negative correlation between energy price and supply under natural monopoly, while the
latter variables move in the same direction under free entry. 11 Therefore, at equilibrium, en-
ergy consumption will increase under free entry, and will decrease under natural monopoly.
Henceforth, the latter seems to be better adapted to reduce energy use. Nonetheless, given
the complementarity between energy and capital, the latter supply effect may be paradox-
ically accompanied by a slower diffusion of clean technologies under natural monopoly.
This is exactly what we will study in the next section.
10Some complementarity is anyway needed to ensure a finite scrapping time as mentioned in earlier sections.
11We insist that these relationships are generic, at least for the free entry configuration. Under natural
monopoly, our properties derive immediately from the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. Other pricing rules are pos-
sible under natural monopoly but we prefer to focus on the latter pricing for its simplicity and the ease of
comparison with the free entry case within our benchmark analysis.
15
4 The impact of investment subsidies on investment and output
In this section, we study the effects of subsidies on investment and the output-maximizing
subsidies.
4.1 Impact of subsidies on investment level
Let us start with investment response to an increment in the subsidy rate sq. From (21), one
gets:
i =
1
T
(
h
A
)α
.
Notice that an increase in sq has a priori an ambiguous effect on investment. On one hand,
it shortens scrapping (Proposition 2), inducing a more intense investment effort in the new
and cleaner technologies (demand effect), but one the other hand, it also affects investment
in the energy sector (variable h) and therefore the energy supply (supply effect). By Propo-
sition 3, we know that such an effect dramatically depends on the market structure of the
energy sector. It follows that the overall effect of larger investment subsidies on the invest-
ment level is unclear and mainly depends on whether the energy market is under FE or NM
structures.
We can go a step further and bring an analytical solution to the ambiguity problem stated
just above. One can use equations (20) and (22) to write i as a function of T . One gets:
i = (b)
α
1−α A
α
α−1
e
αγT
α−1
T
. (25)
We shall denote by Θ(T ) the function: Θ(T ) = e
αγT
α−1
T . Under the structure FE, that is when
α < 1, function Θ(T ) is decreasing as the product of two positive decreasing functions.
Therefore, i investment is boosted by investment subsidies in such a situation since they
lower equipment lifetime. Actually, using our interpretation just above, a larger subsidy
will yield both positive demand and supply effects in such a case: not only investment is
boosted by the typical demand effect inherent to vintage models, it is also stimulated by the
rise of energy supply as depicted in Proposition 3, property iii), due to gross complemen-
tarity between energy and capital. Therefore under (FE), we get the paradoxical property
that subsidizing clean technologies speeds up diffusion as expected but this success is paid
at equilibrium by a rise in energy use!
Things are much more complicated in the NM case where the supply effect lowering energy
use pushes investment level down, and can offset the positive demand effect induced by
the investment subsidy. We show hereafter that the result depends on the strength of the
natural monopoly in a very concrete sense.
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To clarify the latter concept, let us start with some trivial algebra. Clearly, the impact of sub-
sidies depends algebraically on the properties of functions Θ(T ). Differentiating it yields:
Θ′(T ) =
e
αγT
α−1
T 2
[
αγT
α− 1 − 1
]
.
Suppose α > 1 and γT < 1. Recall that the latter condition is sufficient to guarantee the re-
alism of the model, and in particular that T is decreasing under technological accelerations.
The main trick which allows to be conclusive is the observation that T is independent of α
(property (ii) of Proposition 2). Therefore, one can “play” on α without affecting the long-
run equilibrium value of T . Since αα−1 is a strictly decreasing function of α, the outcome is
clear. For α > α0 = 11−γT , Θ
′(T ) < 0, and investment, being a decreasing function of scrap-
ping, is boosted by subsidies. In such a case, the NM structure yields the same prediction
as the FE structure. However, when 1 < α < α0 = 11−γT , we get Θ
′(T ) > 0, and investment
gets depressed by subsidies! Therefore, under the NM structure, investment is stimulated
by subsidies if and only if the natural monopoly is strong enough in the sense that returns to
the production function in the energy sector are large enough (or equivalently, if and only if
the average cost in the energy sector is decreasing rapidly enough). Below the α-threshold
value, α0, the reverse happens. We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1, the following
properties hold:
(i) Under the FE structure, an increase in the investment subsidy sq raises the investment level
in the long-run.
(ii) Under the NM structure, an increase in investment subsidy stimulates long-run investment
if and only if returns to the production function in the energy sector are large enough, i.e. if and only
if α > α0 = 11−γT . Otherwise, either investment is depressed (1 < α < α
0 = 11−γT ) or insensitive
to fiscal stimulus (α = α0 = 11−γT ).
Henceforth, our model shows clearly that the market structure of the energy sector does
matter as to the efficiency of investment subsidy. The interpretation of the previous propo-
sition is quite neat. As mentioned above, raising the investment subsidy rate sq definitely
stimulates investment, but induces a supply effect which depends on the market structure
of the energy sector. Under an FE structure for the energy sector, energy use goes up, thus
reinforcing the former demand effect, and boosting investment given complementarity be-
tween energy and capital. Under an NM structure for the energy sector, energy use goes
down, and can eventually offset the positive demand effect again given complementarity
between capital and energy. Proposition 4 shows that this happens under weak enough
increasing returns in the production technology of energy. In such a case, one gets the
paradoxical property that while investment subsidies lower energy use, they do slowdown
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investment and therefore the diffusion of clean technologies. Clearly the strength of the
supply effect depends on the shape of the (decreasing) average cost in the energy sector: if
it is decreasing fast enough, then the supply effect will be limited, energy supply will fall
but the magnitude of the drop is limited, and so will be the decline in the investment level
involved. The positive demand effect will dominate. Only in such a case, we get the virtu-
ous simultaneous occurrence of lower energy use and faster clean technologies diffusion.
Thus, in general one can see that an increase in investment subsidies generally triggers
a higher diffusion of energy-saving technologies as new capital embodies energy-saving
technological change. However, our analysis of subsidies within the general equilibrium
vintage setting considered brings out two important results. First of all, and consistently
with several empirical studies (listed in the introduction section), our paper shows that
while investment subsidies may speed up the diffusion of clean technologies, this need not
be associated with a lower energy consumption at equilibrium. Second, it could even be
the case that investment subsidies do not speed up the diffusion of clean technologies: this
is clearly the case under natural monopoly in the energy sector with weakly increasing re-
turns and Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. This new result points at an intermediate energy market
configuration which is definitely bad for clean technology diffusion.
How does this affect output response? Before getting to the algebraic developments, a few
comments are in order. By construction, the production function of the final good (which
is used for consumption, investment and production of energy) is a vintage capital Leon-
tief technology. It depends on two ingredients: investment and lifetime of machines. The
larger investment and the longer the lifetime of machines, the larger output. When the
investment subsidy is raised, the lifetime of machines always drops, but not necessarily
investment. Under an FE structure in the energy sector, investment does increase, and it
is also the case under an NM structure with large enough increasing returns. In these two
cases, the overall impact of rising investment subsidies is ambiguous and will be tackled in
the next section. Note however that if we retain an NM configuration with low enough in-
creasing returns, the overall effect of subsidies on output is already clear: both the lifetime
of machines and investment drop, which unambiguously and markedly depresses output.
Henceforth, the latter case is clearly identified as the case against investment subsidies in
terms of investment and output impact though it pushes energy consumption down. Let
us summarize this property in the following Corollary to Proposition 4.
Corollary Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1, long-run output
level declines in response to rising investment subsidies under the NM structure for the energy sector
with low enough increasing returns.
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4.2 Impact of subsidies on output level
Using equations (18) and (25), one can readily express detrended output y as a function of
T , precisely:
y = Ψ
e
αγT
α−1
T
[
1− e−γT ] , (26)
where Ψ is a constant independent of sq, implying that the impact of investment subsidies
on y exclusively depends on the shape of its relationship with T . The first T -function, e
αγT
α−1
T ,
comes from long-term investment level as given in equation (25). It is a decreasing function
of T , and notice that it goes to infinity when T goes to zero. The second T -function, 1−e−γT ,
measures directly the impact of capital lifetime on output: a longer lifetime implies a larger
output level (since firms will operate a wider range of machines). Notice that this term goes
to zero when T tends to infinity. How does output behave when T tends to infinity given
that the investment effect goes to infinity and the scrapping time effect goes to zero? A
trivial computation leads to the result that output will tend to a constant Ψγ when T goes
to zero. This happens when the subsidy rate sq tends to 1: output is still defined in the limit
and equal to a well-identified constant. Nonetheless, such a situation violates the positivity
of consumption level in the long-run. By equation (17), since either y and h are finite when
T goes to zero while i becomes infinite, consumption must go to −∞. We shall therefore
disregard this limit situation as economically irrelevant.
Let us dig deeper. Differentiating output as given by the previous equation with respect to
T , one ends up finding that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the following
difference:
e−γT
[
1− γT
α− 1
]
−
(
1− α
α− 1 γT
)
,
which is by no means trivial and depends, among others, on the position of αwith respect to
1. The following proposition states that output level is a monotonic function of the subsidy
in both remaining cases: α < 1 or α > α0, that is either under the FE or NM structures
provided the increasing returns are large enough in the latter configuration. Beside this
property, the FE and NM structures produce opposite results, as stated in the next and final
proposition:
Proposition 5 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1:
(i) Under the FE structure, long-run output is an increasing function of the subsidy rate, sq.
(ii) Under the NM structure with large enough increasing returns, long-run output is a decreas-
ing function of the subsidy rate, sq.
The proof is a bit tricky, we report it in detail in the appendix. Two remarks are in order
here. First of all, the mechanisms underlying the properties highlighted just above are
clear. Under either an FE or NM structure (with large enough increasing returns), rising the
subsidy rate increases investment, which raises output, but lowers the lifetime of machines,
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which reduces output. Property i) above means that under the FE configuration, the first
effect always dominates. In the alternative case, the opposite happens. That is in the NM
case, the increase in investment following the rise in the subsidy rate is not large enough
to compensate for the output loss due to the larger fraction of capital scrapped. Secondly,
the proposition tends to confirm that the NM structure for the energy sector eliminates
the potential advantages of investment subsidies in terms of output gains, whatever the
extent of increasing returns in that sector. One would conclude from this property that
such subsidies would be welfare-worsening under the NM structure as a decrease in output
level is likely to induce a drop in consumption level, therefore driving welfare down. This
is not that trivial within our benchmark set-up as one can infer from equation (17), and
it is even less in more general frameworks attributing to energy consumption a welfare
loss associated to the induced pollution increment.Indeed, one has to keep in mind that
while the NM structure may not be the best market structure to raise investment in cleaner
technologies, it does allow to reach a lower energy consumption. Ultimately, the arbitrage
between NM and FE structures would thus depend on how consumption and pollution (or
environmental quality) are weighted in the preferences of the economic agents. This issue
is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 The impact of carbon taxes
We shall briefly discuss here the impact of carbon taxes in the diffusion of clean technolo-
gies. More specifically, we aim to compare the efficiency of the latter with the properties of
investment subsidies studied before. Let us make the following observation before getting
to the analytics. In order to disentangle the pure effects due to the carbon tax, we will not
account for second-round effects possibly occuring if the resources collected by the tax are
further used to reinforce the intended diffusion of clean technologies (for example if they
go to finance the investment subsidies studied above).
Suppose the government want to permanently tax energy consumption (carbon tax)
at rate τe. As one can check, in the steady state only equation (20), that is the scrapping
condition, will get altered, becoming:
pe(1 + τe) = b e
−γT .
Importantly enough, the optimal investment decision (19), which gives the steady state
value of scrapping, does not change. As a result, an increase in the tax τe will not affect
scrapping time in contrast to an increase in investment subsidy. Therefore, the impact of a
carbon tax is much simpler compared to the previous policy.12 We summarize here after the
sequence of effects following the recursive structure of the steady state system (16)-(22).
12This simplification occurs because the steady state optimal scrapping does not depend on the characteristics
of the energy market, which is ultimately due to the linearity of the production function.
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1. First of all, an increase in τe increases the operation cost of machines (which detrended
form is the left-hand side of equation (20)) without affecting their marginal productiv-
ity (which detrended form is given by the right hand-side of (20)). As a consequence,
for the scrapping condition to still hold, the (detrended) energy price should fall.
2. In virtue of the zero profit condition (22), the impact on energy production depends
on the energy sector market structure. If α < 1, that is under the FE structure, en-
ergy production will be cut. In contrast, under the NM structure, if α > 1, energy
production will be increased.
3. Now, we get to the impact on investment in clean technologies as given by equation
(21):
i =
1
T
(
h
A
)α
.
Because the carbon tax does not modify the value of the scrapping time (unlike the
investment subsidy policy), its impact on investment will track its impact on produc-
tion in the energy sector. In other words, a carbon tax will speed up the diffusion of
clean technologies under the NM structure, and will decrease it under the FE struc-
ture. However, given the point above, this means that we have again, as in the sub-
sidy case, an ambiguous outcome: at long-run equilibrium, a carbon tax will end up
increasing energy consumption but speeding up diffusion of new technologies under
natural monopoly, while in the free entry case, we have the opposite picture. Finally
notice also by the (detrended) production function (18), that the comparative statics
of output level are the same as those of investment level.
So in contrast to the investment subsidy, carbon taxes cannot generate a double-dividend
outcome: either diffusion of clean technologies is fastened but total energy consumption
increases (NM structure) or diffusion slowed down with energy consumption going down
(FE structure). Needless to say, this result should be taken as it is: a comparison with the
investment subsidy policy. As mentioned in the introduction, the picture is incomplete and
the efficiency analysis of carbon taxes should incorporate the way resources collected are
used: for example carbon taxes may be used to finance investment subsidies, which might
be a way to ensure double-dividend outcomes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium vintage capital model with energy saving-
technological progress, endogenous scrapping and an explicit energy market. Because of
the scrapping condition inherent to vintage capital models, the price of energy is tightly
connected with the (optimal) age structure of the operating capital stock. The impact of
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imperfect competition on the outcomes of the decentralized equilibria are deeply char-
acterized along the paper. In particular, we show that investment subsidies designed to
fasten the diffusion of cleaner technologies may not always achieve this objective due a a
well-identified general equilibrium effect. Such a result is rather consistent with the highly
conflicting related empirical reports. More specifically, increasing investment subsidies do
not only generate the typical positive demand effect on investment, often pointed out in
partial equilibrium studies, they also affect energy supply and equilibrium energy price,
which affects again investment via the scrapping mechanism repeatedly invoked along this
paper. Under a free entry structure for the energy sector, the latter effect is positive, thus
reinforcing the former demand effect, and boosting investment. Under a natural monopoly
structure for the energy sector, the supply effect is negative, and can eventually offset the
positive demand effect, which does happen when increasing returns in the production tech-
nology in the energy sector are not strong enough. We have got more results on the impact
of investment subsidies on output level.
Of course, the mechanisms and results identified in this paper deserve further empirical
and theoretical analysis. It goes without saying that our results are extracted under linear
production functions in the final good sector, and this linearity simplifies our study to a
certain extent. In particular, it allows to solve for the balanced growth paths following a
straightforward recursive scheme. Such a scheme, in turns, has allowed for a neat iden-
tification of the demand and supply effects described along the paper. We are currently
studying another version of the model with a more general production function which
breaks down partially the above-mentioned recursivity, therefore only allowing for numer-
ical analysis. Another useful complementary study concerns the empirical testing of the
theory developed in this paper, which requires in particular an accurate appraisal of the
characteristics of energy markets. This looks like a daunting task but it is certainly a nec-
essary step to take to understand the diffusion factors of clean technologies. Finally, our
analysis calls for a further investigation on the welfare implications of investment subsi-
dies. As mentioned in the previous section, while the NM structure may not be the best
market structure for investment subsidies to speed up diffusion of cleaner technologies, it
does lower energy consumption in the long-run equilibrium. Therefore, the welfare impli-
cations of our analysis are far from obvious and would deserve a closer appraisal taking
into account the welfare loss due to pollution. We are currently working along this line.
Appendix : Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: As already mentioned, Properties (i) and (ii) are trivial. Let us prove
Property (iii). To this end, we need the following Lemma.
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Lemma Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, the product γT is an increasing function
of γ.
Proof of Lemma. Observe that:
∂(γT )
∂γ
= T + γ
∂T
∂γ
= T − γ
∂F
∂γ
∂F
∂T
which implies
∂F
∂T
∂(γT )
∂γ
= T
∂F
∂T
− γ ∂F
∂γ
¿From relation (24), the function F can be rewritten as
F (T, γ, ρ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρz
(
e−γz − e−γT )du
the required partial derivatives can be obtained after some algebraic operations:
T
∂F
∂T
− γ ∂F
∂γ
=
∫ T
0
γz e−(ρ+γ)zdu
which is positive. From Proposition 1, we know that ∂F∂T > 0, we deduce that γT is an
increasing function of γ. 
It is now possible to prove Property (iii) of Proposition 2. Consistently with Boucekkine et
al. (1998), we will show that a sufficient condition for T to decrease with γ is T ≤ 1γ . The
latter property is satisfied if ρ+ γ < b4(1−sq) . In fact, the total differentiation of the equation
F (T, γ, .) = 1 leads to
∂T
∂γ
= −
∂F
∂γ
∂F
∂T
As ∂F∂T > 0 (Proposition 1), T is a decreasing function of γ if and only if the partial derivative
of F with respect to γ is positive. Given that
∂F
∂γ
=
∫ T
0
∫ T
z
(1 + γ + σ) e−(ρz+γσ)dσ du
a sufficient condition for T to decrease when γ rises is the positivity of function 1 − γσ on
the integration domain. This is checked if only if the line σ = 1γ is above the integration
domain. This is the case if T ≤ 1γ . Now, note that, using the integral function defined in
(23), the condition T ≤ 1γ is equivalent to the inequality 1−sqb ≤ F ( 1γ , .). Computing the
integration yields
1− sq
b
≤ e
−( γ+ρ
γ
) − 1
−(γ + ρ) −
e
−( γ+ρ
γ
) − e−1
−ρ
In terms of parameters’ expressions of Proposition 1, denote x = ρ+γb′ , with b
′ = 1−sqb .
Observe that x > γ′ ≡ γb′ . Elementary algebraic operations allow us to write the following
inequality
x2 +
(
e−1 − 1− γ′)x+ γ′ < γ′e−xγ
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For any fixed γ′, one can find the values of x (x > γ′) such that the above inequality holds.
Note that this inequality is very easy to tabulate for function in x and γ′ on both sides. In
particular, the inequality holds for γ′ < x < 14 . Such a sufficient condition ensures that T
is decreasing with respect to γ and is consistent with parameterizations usually adopted in
empirical studies. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that the sign of the derivative of output with respect to
scrapping time T is the sign of the difference
e−γT
[
1− γT
α− 1
]
−
(
1− α
α− 1 γT
)
,
which we may write ψ1(T )− ψ2(T ) with obvious notations.
Consider the case α < 1. We have to study both functions ψ1(T ) and ψ2(T ) for 0 ≤ T ≤ 1γ .
ψ2(T ) is an affine function increasing from 1 to 11−α . Differentiating ψ1(T ) one gets:
ψ′1(T ) = γ e
−γT α− γT
1− α .
Therefore, ψ(T ) is increasing on the interval [0 αγ ], from ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 1 to ψ1
(
α
γ
)
, then
decreasing on the interval (αγ
1
γ ]. On the other hand, one can readily prove that ψ1(T ) is
strictly concave on the whole interval [0 1γ ]. Indeed:
ψ′′1(T ) = γ e
−γT
[
− 2γ
1− α +
γ2T
1− α
]
,
and since T ≤ 1γ , we get ψ′′1(T ) < 0 on the interval [0 1γ ]. Notice now that ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 1
and that ψ′1(0) = ψ′2(0) =
αγ
1−α . Hence the two functions start at the same point at T = 0
and with the same slope (tangency). Since ψ1(T ) is strictly concave while ψ2(T ) is affine
increasing, it follows that the two functions can not intersect in the interval (0 αγ ], and
ψ2(T ) > ψ1(T ) on this interval. This establishes the first part of Proposition 5.
Let us consider now the case α > α0 = 11−γT > 1. In such a case, ψ2(T ) is an affine function
decreasing from 1 to 11−α . The crucial thing with respect to the case α < 1 is that ψ1(T )
is now strictly decreasing and strictly convex on the interval [0 1γ ]. It is enough to have a
look at the expressions of the first and second order derivatives of this function displayed
just above. Further given that ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 1 and that ψ′1(0) = ψ′2(0), the two functions
cannot intersect, and ψ2(T ) < ψ1(T ) on (0 1γ ]. 
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